SourceLessExplorer · SourceLess AsgardSourceLess Asgard · chain 1313
LiveHeight25,522Head age9 sLast interval1 minFinality25,511Behind−11Pending0 / 8,192Tx in head0
XPlorer following the chain as its own read-only node

height 25522 of 25522 on the network. 9 peer(s) connected, 91 in its peer directory; 2818 block(s) followed and 2298 pulled in by sync since this follower started. Caught up: this follower holds every block any peer has claimed, so every panel below is the whole chain. Genesis 1cf8655125cc1bbb…, producers genesis.

What this follower is, locally

Following 7 seed(s) — their addresses are not published here, for the reason the peer table gives. Its store is held under its own Cerberus lease — no other node’s store is opened, touched or stopped.

Cryptography

In force on this chain7
of 9 carried by this build. The gap is the point of this page: a list of what a binary CAN do is a capability sheet, and what a reader needs is what this chain’s own records actually depend on
Signaturesed25519
what every transaction, record and attestation on this chain is actually signed with today. The post-quantum suite beside it is carried and is named below with exactly what it covers
A hybrid signature costs3,309B
per attestation, per block, for ever. That is why a hybrid signature is a decision and not a default: a block carrying one per seat pays this per seat, permanently
  • In force on this chain 7 77.8% a record on this chain depends on it
  • Carried and unused 2 22.2% compiled into this build and reached by nothing this chain does. Present is not the same as protecting anything, and this page refuses to count them together

Nothing on this page changes while it is open, so nothing on it is polled. These are properties of this build and of this chain’s genesis rather than measurements of a running network, and a page that re-requested them on a timer would be asking a validator to do work for an answer that cannot have moved.

Post-quantum parameters

Signature suite
ml-dsa-65
Key agreement
ml-kem-768
Hybrid identity
ed25519+ml-dsa-65
Signature size
3309 bytes
Public key
1952 bytes
KEM public key
1184 bytes
KEM ciphertext
1088 bytes

The sizes are here because they are the reason a hybrid signature is a decision rather than a default: a block carrying one attestation per seat pays these bytes per seat, every block, forever.

Account signatures

Suite
ed25519
Used for
every transfer, domain claim, identity record, wrap, delegation and contract authorization
In force on this chain
yes

Addresses

Suite
sha256 over the public key, rendered zk13str_<40 hex>_<4 hex>
Used for
deriving an address from a key, and checking that a declared key derives the address it claims
In force on this chain
yes

Block and record commitments

Suite
sha256
Used for
the transaction root, the records root, the state root and every block hash
In force on this chain
yes

Wallet key derivation

Suite
BIP-39 over 2048 words, then HKDF-SHA256 to ed25519
Used for
turning a 24-word recovery phrase into an account key and a vault key
In force on this chain
yes

The phrase reaches the account and the vault. A passphrase added to a wallet file does not travel with it.

Post-quantum signatures

Suite
ml-dsa-65
Used for
hybrid attestations and Gemini identities, beside the ed25519 signature rather than instead of it
In force on this chain
carried by this build and not used by this chain

Carried by this build and not used by the blocks on this chain: the head's attestations are ed25519 only. A hybrid signature costs 3309 bytes each, which is the reason it is a decision rather than a default.

Post-quantum key agreement

Suite
ml-kem-768
Used for
the Bifrost handshake between nodes, so a recorded session cannot be opened later
In force on this chain
yes

Between nodes, on the wire. It protects the transport and not the ledger: a record is signed by its holder, and that signature is the ed25519 one above.

Session encryption

Suite
AES-256-GCM under a per-direction key, counter nonces
Used for
every frame between two peers after the handshake
In force on this chain
yes

One writer per key, so two nodes cannot collide on a counter — which is what makes a counter safe as a nonce.

Keys at rest

Suite
scrypt N=2^17, then AES-256-GCM
Used for
the wallet file, the node identity and the seat key
In force on this chain
yes

Encryption at rest does not defend a compromise of the account that holds the passphrase.

Zero-knowledge proofs

Suite
zk13-schnorr-cp-modp14-v2
Used for
proving a statement about an identity without revealing it
In force on this chain
carried by this build and not used by this chain

The reference implementation. It is not on the consensus path of this chain: no block on it is accepted or refused on the strength of a ZK13 proof.

ZK13

Version
zk13-schnorr-cp-modp14-v2
On the consensus path
no — no block is accepted or refused on the strength of a proof

Adding a real proving system exceeds the 1-direct dependency budget; see ZK13_PRODUCTION_REQUIREMENTS and scripts/check-deps.mjs. Escalate to governance.

Before production it must
An ANONYMITY SET. A proof of knowledge of the discrete log of ONE named commitment is a signature, and this tree already has ed25519 and Gemini for that - binding `y` to an identity would make ZK13 a slower, larger, redundant signature scheme, not a private one. The property that makes a nullifier worth having is "I am one of these N, and I will not say which". That needs either a linkable ring signature, whose proof grows linearly in N, or a SNARK over a Merkle-membership circuit, whose proof is constant-size. Neither is a variation on the code in this file.
A CLOSED, ON-CHAIN SET OF ADMISSIBLE COMMITMENTS, folded into the state root and replayed from blocks, so every node agrees on which commitments exist and none can be minted at will. That is chain state (the Idunn/Sindri/Glasir pattern), not a `src/crypto/` object.
A NULLIFIER LEDGER that is also chain state. Reuse is only DETECTED by something that keeps a record; a record on one node's heap is empty after a restart and shared with nobody, which is why `NullifierRegistry` was deleted rather than kept (see below).
A TRUSTED SETUP, if the route chosen is a SNARK: a ceremony whose output becomes a verifying key committed to genesis and thereafter consensus-critical. That is an operational event with named participants and a published transcript, not a merge.
A CALL SITE that consumes a proof, and a `CryptoRuntimePolicy` derived from the node's declared mode. Neither exists, and neither can be created from inside `src/crypto/`.

5 requirements, and this is all of them — not a page of a longer list.